1. Water

Water is a precious commodity in Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

About two-thirds of the existing fresh water supply comes from reservoirs in the North. The main underground distribution system is the National Water Carrier that runs from the North to the South providing water to cities and settlements along the way. Supplemental water supply is provided from treated wastewater, brackish water and water harvesting (collection, storage and storm runoff).

The existing water supply is dwindling with estimates by some that Israel will face a major water crisis by 2012.

A major potential source of water exists below the Negev Desert. This desert, which comprises 60% of Israel’s territory with only 7% of its population has below it a huge aquifer. The water itself is brackish, somewhat salty (4 grams/ cubic meter; sea water has 35 grams of salt / cubic meter) but can be and is used for special crops and special industries. Deionization of brackish water is less expensive by one third than desalinization of seawater. Forty desalinization units have been erected over the past few decades--of these twenty-three treat brackish water by reverse osmosis on a commercial basis.

Additional issues with water use and distribution exist. Increasing salinity in the ground water in Gaza City is of concern and only 70 % of units are connected to the sewage network. The preservation and supplementing of water sources for the Gaza Strip is particularly acute. The primary causes of deterioration of water quality in Gaza include: Seawater encroachment, upward trend of leisure activities, irrigation by saline water, excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides and apparent infiltration of treated sewage and agricultural drainage into the water system. The shallow water table often exists less than 2m below the surface depleting fresh water by the incursion of seawater.

2. Climatic and Environmental Concerns

The Gaza Strip is located in a transitional zone between the arid desert climate of the Sinai Peninsula and the temperate and semi-humid Mediterranean climate along the coast.

The average daily mean temperature ranges from 25 degrees C in summer to 13 degrees C in winter.

The rainy season extends from October to early May and rainfall peaks in December thru February. The average mean rainfall on the Gaza strip amounts to about 400mm. Rain in the Negev desert is negligible.

Wind is constant, coming primarily from the SW during the spring and summer and during the winter months comes from the W. NW across the Mediterranean.

The planned architectural responses to such environment conditions are many. Responses to climate influences include the creation of shade in many forms: Roof overhangs and shades (the simplest), photovoltaic arrays for hot water, wind towers for ventilation, high windows for ventilation from higher room heights, small apertures in building walls on the south and south west sides of buildings, wood screens and grills to allow air to pass but eliminate sun and privacy issues, use of light colored materials to create high albino materiality, porticos, thick wall construction to reduce heat transfer to the interior of buildings, insulated roofs, moisture producing elements in public and private spaces. More technical and experimental methods of cooling include geothermal systems using heat exchangers to provide special building cooling where necessary.

Higher urban densities create building shadows and shade and more comfortable spaces for people. In low-rise housing, the use of ground floor walled courts, courtyards, and walled roof spaces do the same.

Site consideration responses include the use of pervious surfaces to allow water to pass directly to underground aquifers, maximum use of previous driving surfaces, the capture of rain water for direct use, spot irrigation systems to minimize water use, selected plant selection for minimum water use, and optimum selection and planting of trees for shade and cooling.

New waste treatment plants would continue to recycle water for secondary and additional uses.

3. Power Generation

All power for these projects assumes that new power plants will be constructed. In addition, the critical nature of much of the existing infrastructure of Rafah and Khan Younis and smaller communities like al Shawkeh and Anasr would indicate that these new power generators should have a capacity to provide power to these existing communities as well. The major power sources include photovoltaic arrays or electrical power from the sun, as well as proposals to include wind turbine farms off the coast in the Mediterranean. Geothermal cooling from the Sea should be considered where buildings need special cooling.

Power conservation strategies would be a common theme for these new structures. With natural cooling created by air movement through buildings, the requirement for power is reduced and power conservation is achieved. The methods listed under “Climatic and Environmental Concerns” above would produce a more sustainable environment, one which additionally uses natural elements to help create a more positive and comfortable physical living experience.

June 6 Cabinet Decision on Disengagement
Excerpt from Statement by Cabinet Secretary Yisrael Maimon, June 6

The Cabinet has continued to discuss the Disengagement Plan and has decided as follows:

1. The Cabinet approved a Modified Disengagement Plan, Appendix A, but this decision does not amount to an evacuation of settlements.

2. The Cabinet has approved the preparatory work detailed in Appendix C.

3. After the end of the preparation work the Cabinet will reconvene to hold a separate discussion and decide whether or not settlements should be evacuated, which settlements and at what pace, considering the circumstances at that time.

4. The Modified Disengagement Plan approved as per 1 above was preceded by an exchange of letters between U.S. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 14, 2004. The letter from the U.S. President is presented herein. Attached are Appendices A and C (Appendix A – Modified Disengagement Plan -Key Principles; Appendix C – Format of Preparations for the Modified Disengagement Plan).

At the conclusion of the discussion on the matter the Prime Minister noted that in two sessions the Cabinet discussed the aforementioned issue for 15 hours; it was a deep and comprehensive discussion, one of the most important the Cabinet has had in recent years. The Prime Minister added that the intention is to complete the implementation of the Plan by the end of 2005. Likewise he intends to complete the necessary preparation work by March 1, 2005.

Immediately after the end of the preparation work the Government will convene to make decisions about the continued execution of the plan. The Prime Minister stressed that once the decision is taken all of the ministers have to stand behind it. The Prime Minister thanked Minister Tzippi Livni, his Bureau Chief Dubi Weissglass, Cabinet Secretary Yisrael Maimon, Director General of the Ministry of Justice Aharon Abramowitz, Chairman of the National Security Council Giora Eiland and the ministers, who spent days and nights to find an agreed formula for the approval of the plan.

Appendix A – Modified Disengagement Plan - Key Principles
I. Background - Diplomatic and Security Significance

The State of Israel is committed to the peace process and endeavors to reach an agreed arrangement based on the vision presented by U.S. President George W. Bush.

Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements 22

The State of Israel believes it must take action to improve the current situation. The State of Israel has reached the conclusion that there is currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral peace process. Given this, a modified disengagement plan has been drawn up, based on the following considerations:

a. The stalemate embodied in the current situation is damaging; in order to break the stalemate, the State of Israel must initiate a process that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians.

b. The aim of the plan is to bring about a better security, diplomatic economic and demographic reality.

c. In any future permanent arrangement, there will be no Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that some parts of Judea and Samaria (including key concentrations of Jewish settlements, civilian communities, security zones and areas in which Israel has a vested interest) will remain part of the State of Israel.

d. The State of Israel supports the efforts of the United States, which is working along with the international community, to promote the process of reform, the establishment of institutions and improving the economic and welfare conditions of the Palestinian people, so that a new Palestinian leadership can arise, proving itself capable of fulfilling its obligations under the Road Map.

e. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from the northern part of Samaria will reduce friction with the Palestinian population.

f. Completion of the plan will negate the validity of any claims against Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip.

g. The process in this plan does not detract from relevant existing agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The relevant security arrangements will remain in force.

h. International support for this process is widespread and important. This support is vital in ensuring that the Palestinians fulfill their obligations in terms of fighting terror and implementing reforms, in accordance with the road map. Only then will the sides be able to resume negotiations.

II. Key Points of the Plan

A. The Process
1. The necessary preparations will be undertaken for the implementation of the plan (including administrative work to determine the criteria, definitions, estimates and preparation of necessary legislation).

2. Immediately after the completion of this preparation work there will be a Government discussion to decide on the evacuation of settlements in consideration of the circumstances at that time – whether to evacuate or not, and which settlements.

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The settlements will be split into the following four groups:

1. Group A - Morag, Netzarim, Kfar Darom.
2. Group B - The four settlements in northern Samaria (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh).
3. Group C - The Gush Katif block of settlements.
4. Group D - The settlements in the northern Gaza Strip (Alei Sinai, Dugit and Nisanit).

It is noted that after the end of the aforementioned preparations the Government will convene periodically to decide on the question of whether there will be any evacuation or not, regarding each of the groups separately.

3. The continuation of the process as described above and below will be subject to the decisions the Government makes as stated in section 2 above and carried out in accordance with the contents of the decisions.

3.1 The Gaza Strip

1. The State of Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip, including Israeli settlements, and will redeploy outside the area of the Strip. The method of the withdrawal, with the exception of a military presence in the area adjacent to the border between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphi Route), is detailed below.

2. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the evacuated territorial area of the Gaza Strip.

3.2 Judea and Samaria

3. The State of Israel will withdraw from northern Samaria (four settlements: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh) as well as all permanent military installations in the area, and will redeploy outside the evacuated area.

4. Once the move has been completed, there will be no permanent Israeli military presence in the area.

5. The move will provide Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern parts of Samaria.

6. The State of Israel, along with the international community, will help improve the transportation infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, with the goal of providing continuous transport for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.

7. The move will make it easier for Palestinians to live a normal life in Judea and Samaria, and will facilitate economic and commercial activity.

3.3 The withdrawal process is slated to end by the end of 2005.

Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements 24

B. The Security Fence

The State of Israel will continue to construct the security fence, in accordance with the relevant cabinet decisions. In deciding on the route of the fence, humanitarian considerations will be taken into account.

IV. The Security Reality after the Evacuation

A. The Gaza Strip

1. The State of Israel will monitor and supervise the outer envelope on land, will have exclusive control of the Gaza airspace, and will continue its military activity along the Gaza Strip's coastline.

2. The Gaza Strip will be completely demilitarized of arms banned by current agreements between the sides.

3. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the Gaza Strip.

B. The West Bank

1. After the evacuation of the northern Samaria settlements, there will be no permanent military presence in that area.

2. The State of Israel reserves the basic right to self defense, which includes taking preventive measures as well as the use of force against threats originating in the area.

3. Military activity will remain in its current framework in the rest of the West Bank. The State of Israel will, if circumstances allow, consider reducing its activity in Palestinian cities.

4. The State of Israel will work to reduce the number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank.

V. Military Infrastructure and Installations in the Gaza Strip and the Northern Samaria Region

All will be dismantled and evacuated, except for those that the State of Israel decides to transfer to an authorized body.

VI. The Nature of Security Assistance to the Palestinians

The State of Israel agrees that in coordination with it, consulting, assistance and training will be provided to Palestinian security forces for the purpose of fighting terror and maintaining the public order. The assistance will be provided by American, British, Egyptian, Jordanian or other experts, as will be agreed upon with Israel.

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The State of Israel stresses that it will not agree to any foreign security presence in Gaza or the West Bank without its consent.

VII. The Border Area between the Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi Route)

The State of Israel will continue to maintain military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (the Philadelphi route.) This presence is an essential security requirement. The physical widening of the route where the military activity will take place may be necessary in certain areas. The possibility of evacuating the area will be considered later on. This evacuation would be conditioned, among other factors, on the security reality and on the level of cooperation by Egypt in creating an alternative credible arrangement. If and when the conditions permit the evacuation of the area, the State of Israel will be willing to consider the possibility of setting up an airport and a seaport in the Gaza Strip, subject to arrangements agreed upon with the State of Israel.

VIII. Real Estate

In general, houses belonging to the settlers, and other sensitive structures such as synagogues will not be left behind. The State of Israel will aspire to transfer other structures, such as industrial and agricultural facilities, to an international third party that will use them for the benefit of the Palestinian population that is not engaged in terrorism.

The Erez industrial zone will be transferred to an agreed-upon Palestinian or international body.

The State of Israel along with Egypt will examine the possibility of setting up a joint industrial zone on the border between Israel, Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

IX. Infrastructure and Civilian Arrangements

The water, electricity, sewage and communications infrastructures will be left in place.

As a rule, Israel will enable the continued supply of electricity, water, gas and fuel to the Palestinians, under the existing arrangements and full compensation.

The existing arrangements, including the arrangements with regard to water and the electromagnetic area, will remain valid.

X. The Activity of the International Civilian Organizations

The State of Israel views very favorably continued activity of the international humanitarian organizations and those that deal will civil development, which aid the Palestinian population.

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The State of Israel will coordinate with the international organizations the arrangements that will make this activity easier. The State of Israel suggests that an international mechanism (such as the AHLC) be set up, in coordination with Israel and international bodies, that will work to develop the Palestinian economy.

XI. Economic Arrangements

In general, the economic arrangements that are currently in effect between Israel and the Palestinians will remain valid. These arrangements include, among other things:

A. The movement of goods between the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Israel and foreign countries.

B. The monetary regime.

C. The taxation arrangements and the customs envelope.

D. Postal and communications arrangements.

E. The entry of workers into Israel in accordance with the existing criteria. In the long run, and in accordance with the Israeli interest in encouraging Palestinian economic independence, the State of Israel aspires to reduce the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel, and eventually to completely stop their entrance. The State of Israel will support the development of employment sources in the Gaza Strip and in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank, by international bodies.

XII. The International Crossing Points

A. The international Crossing Point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt

1. The existing arrangements will remain in force. 2. Israel is interested in transferring the crossing point to the "border triangle," south of its current location. This will be done in coordination with the Egyptian Government. This will allow the expansion of the hours of activity at the crossing point.

B. The International Crossing Points between Judea and Samaria and Jordan

The existing arrangements will remain in force.

XIII. The Erez Crossing Point

The Erez crossing point will be moved into the territory of the State of Israel according to a timetable that will be determined separately.

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XIV. Summary

The goal is for the implementation of the plan to bring about an improvement in the situation and a break from the current stagnation. If and when the Palestinian side shows evidence of its willingness and ability to actually take action to fight terrorism, a full cessation of terror and violence and the carrying out of reforms according to the Road Map, it will be possible to return to the track of discussions and negotiations.